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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS K. HOLLAND, dba 
American Homes Company, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SANDI BROWN, aka 
Mrs. W. S. Terry, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10011 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant's Statement of the Kind of Case launches 
into a history of the present litigation in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City prior to its appeal by defendant to the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. Since the trial in the 
Dist,rict Court is a trial de novo such explanation is un-
necessary. Defendant also attempts to explain on page 2 
of her Brief why the trial took place in her absence. Ap-
parently we are to believe that counsel did not learn of 
the trial date until the day before, although the date had 
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been assigned at pretrial more than 90 days prior, and that 
his request for a continuance was denied. As a matter of 
fact, the record shows no Motion for a Continuance, and 
it is the writer's recollection that no such motion was ever 
made and that counsel's only concern with a conflict in 
the Murray City Court on the day of trial was that 
he be permitted to go to Murray to handle a matte·r which 
could be disposed of promptly and return, which request 
was granted during the noon recess. 
STATEMENT 0'F FACTS 
Defendant in her Statement of Facts attempts to 
paint a picture of fast talking cookware salesmen who 
uprey" on unmarried girls between 18 and 21 years of age. 
As a matter of fact, the plaintiff is a married student at 
the University of Utah with a family to support and has 
been engaged for eight years in Salt Lake City in selling 
waterless cookware, china, stainless steel and other similar 
items (Tr. 21). His reputation for honesty and fair deal-
ing is not in dispute. The market for the merchandise 
plaintiff handles, as defendant well knows, is primarily 
among unmarried girls who are contemplating marriage~ 
since these items are often sought by young ladies to make 
part of their trousseau (Tr. 3). 
Mr. Merrill Davidson who solicited the particular 
sale in question made an initial contact and an appoint-
ment to call back the following Friday which was de-
fendant's day off (Tr. 4). At this time, he offered the 
defendant a upackage" including some npremiums," for 
a price certain (Tr. 5, 6). Mr. Davidson testified as to a 
discussion concerning a ulay-away" arrangement, where-
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by defendant, in view of her financial situation, could 
pay as little as $5.00 a month until the full contract price 
was paid, and if she were able at any time to increase the 
payments to $14.98 per month, a new contract would 
be executed (Tr. 8,10). Delivery would immediately be 
made in such event since plaintiff would then be able 
to sell the new contract to a finance company and get 
his money back with which to replenish his stock of mer-
chandise. The defendant signed the conditional sales agree-
ment for the $5.00 per month, paid Merrill Davidson 
$1.09 to bind the contract and then, in about a week, 
she contacted Mr. Davidson and expressed a desire to 
cancel because ((her mother was sick and she had ex-
perienced some unexpected bills" (Tr. 12). 
Counsel for defendant has failed to quote the trial 
record with respect to the real reason for cancellation of 
the contract. Mr. Davidson testified that when he called 
on Miss Brown after she requested cancellation of the 
contract, he found a salesman from a competing company, 
a Mr. Roger Phillips of Casual Living Company, in Miss 
Brown's apartment (Tr. 13). Miss Brown made the state-
ment that she was going to buy their merchandise instead 
of that of plaintiff and Davidson informed her that this 
would be foolish in that Miss Brown might then become 
liable on two contracts. The salesman from Casual Living 
told Mr. Davidson that ((this is a competitive business and 
we feel that this type of lay-away contract is fair game 
for us and we just like to go out and cancel them and get 
the girls on these other contracts" (Tr. 14). Douglas K. 
Holland testified that when he and his wife later visited 
defendant's apartment, they were informed that Casual 
Living's merchandise was there (Tr. 27). 
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Mr. Holland further testified that as a result of de-
fendant's breach he lost net profits of $100.00, being the 
difference between the cost of the merchandise and the 
selling price, less the expenses of the sale (Tr. 28,29). He 
stated that there was no available market for the cook-
ware upon the cancellation of the contract by defendant, 
except by making the same door-to-door contacts includ-
ing demonstrations as had been made in the negotiation 
of the original contract (Tr. 49). 
The Court upon reviewing the verdict of the Jury 
to the effect that Plaintiff was entitled to nominal dam-
ages of $1.00, plus $75.00 attorney's fees, entered judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff's: motion 
for $100.00, plus the attorney's fee as fixed by the Jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A conditional sales contract was entered into between 
the parties which was valid and enforceable. There is no 
evidence whatever of a failure of the minds to meet. Since 
defendant had no witnesses at the trial to testify as to her 
understanding of the contract, the jury, on proper in-
struction, found a contract solely on the basis of the testi-
mony of Mr. Davidson. It was clear from his testimony 
that the term ((lay-away" had an agreed meaning between 
the parties to the contract. No merchandise was actually 
telaid away," but delivery was not to occur until such 
time as the contract balance was paid, or a new contract 
entered into increasing the monthly payment. Since there 
was no contradiction as to this understanding between the 
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parties, the Court rightfully refused all instructions sub-
mitted by the defendant respecting ((lay-away contracts." 
POINT TWO 
The plaintiff's measure of damages in this case should 
be his lost profits. The only figure testified to by any 
witness representing damages in this case was the figure 
$100.00 as established by Douglas K. Holland (Tr. 29). 
The fact that the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff indicates they found the contract to be valid 
and enforceable, but the assessment of damages was with-
out any rhyme or reason whatever. The Court simply 
interposed the $100.00 as justified by the evidence for 
$1.00 which was without any evidence to sustain it. Com-
plete absence of any evidence to sustain a verdict has 
uniformly been held to be a basis for granting a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Morby v. Rogers, 122 Ut. 
540,252 P2d 231. 
Defendant contends that the plaintiff's damages are 
restricted by Title 60-5-2 UCA 1953. That section is set 
forth in full at Page 16 of defendant's brief and empha-
sis is placed on that portion of the statute which reads: 
Where there is an available market for the 
goods in question, the measure of damages is, in 
the absence of special circumstances showing prox-
imate damage of a greater amount, the difference 
between the contract price and the market or cur-
rent price at the time or times when the goods 
ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was 
fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the re-
fusal to accept. 
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It is interesting to note that Paragraph 2 of the same 
statute stresses that rr the measure of damages is the loss 
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary caurse of 
eve-nts from the buyer's breach of contract," and that 
Paragraph 4, after emphasizing that plaintiff must miti-
gate his damages states, rr the profits the seller would have 
made if the contract or the sale would have been fully 
performed shall be considered in estimating such damages." 
The provisions of the Uniform Sales Act have been 
fully treated in annotations at 44 ALR 215 and 108 ALR 
1482 entitled uMeasure of Damages for Buyer's Repudi-
ation of or Failure to Accept Goods Under Executory 
Contract." Many cases are discussed in the annotations 
and of particular interest is the general discussion found 
at 108 ALR pp. 148 3, 1484, where it is stated, uthe guid-
ing principle is to give the seller the benefit of his con-
tract," and, further: 
While express provision is made in the Uni-
form Sales Act, in force in many states, with re-
spect to the measure of damages for a buyer's 
breach, it is said that the seller is not in every case 
limited to one of the measures of damages in that 
act. (Quoting Morrison vs. M. Finkovitch (1927}, 
37GeorgiaApp. 57,138 SE 517). 
After reading the two annotations cited in ALR the 
writer is of the opinion that the measure of damages as 
the difference between contract price and the market 
price at the time and place of delivery is subject to modi-
fication, particularly when it appears that the seller will 
not be given the benefit of his contract by such a strict 
interpretation of the act. This is fully borne out by the 
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Utah case which would seem to be controlling on the 
subject, Stewart vs. Hansen, 62 Ut. 281, 218 Pac. 959, 44 
ALR 3 40. In that case the action was commenced by an 
automobile dealer for damages based upon the buyer's re-
fusal to accept an automobile after entering into a con-
tract of purchase. The Court held that on the buyer's 
refusal to accept the automobile, the seller could recover 
as damages the profits he would otherwise have realized 
and was not limited to the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price. At Page 961, the reason-
ing is set forth as follows: 
If we keep in mind the fact that if in cases 
like the one at bar the general rule of damages for 
breach of con tracts of sale by the purchaser is 
adopted, then the dealer of necessity must in every 
case be the loser by reason of the fact that he loses 
all compensation for his time and efforts in at-
tempting to effect a sale, or in effecting it, of a 
car and in demonstrating it to the prospective 
purchaser and receives nothing for rent, advertis-
ing and other (overhead' expenses. 
How is the situation of the automobile dealer in the 
Stewart v. Hansen case any different from that of the 
cookware dealer in the instant case? In the Stewart v. 
Hansen case the court adopted the law as stated in the 
Connecticut case of Torkomian vs. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 
97 Atl. 760. Connecticut had adopted the Uniform Sales 
Act and the section found at 60-5-2 UCA 1953 was 
therein construed. The Court stated: 
In the absence of special circumstances re-
quiring a different rule, the damages recoverable 
by a vendor for refusal to take goods contracted 
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for is the difference at the time and place of de-
livery between the contract price and the market 
price. But we recognize that this rule is not an 
unbending one, that the circumstances may re-
quire its modification in order to effectuate the 
cardinal purpose, (just compensation for the loss 
incurred'; and the loss must be such as tmay rea-
sonably be supposed to have been in the contempla-
tion of the parties at the time they made the 
contract.' 
* * * 
The defendants, as vendors or contractors, 
were entitled to show what a Lozier Six car would 
have cost them, in the same way a manufacturer 
might show the cost of an article manufactured 
by him. The defendants would thus recover the 
profits they would have made had the plaintiff 
carried out his contract. In such a case profits are 
not speculative, but certain and ascertainable and 
the legitimate fruits of the contract. 
In referring to the decision in the T orkomian case, 
the Utah Supreme Court at Page 961 of Pacific Reporter 
stated that it: 
took all matters into consideration and its fairness 
and justice in that regard are commendable and 
wholesome in that it affords just and fair compen-
sation to the seller without inflicting the slightest 
injustice upon the purchaser and is an inducement 
to all men to meet the obligations assumed by them 
in their contracts. Moreover the rule adopted gives 
the seller the fruits of his bargain which is a matter 
that should always be considered in applying the 
measure of damages in any case. 
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It is further submitted that in the instant case the 
strict interpretation of the Uniform Sales Act cannot 
be applied because there is no uavailable market for the 
goods." A cursory reading of the two ALR annotations 
cited will satisfy the reader that the merchandise involved 
in those cases usually is of the nature of timber, coal, hogs, 
horses, milk and other such commodities, which do have 
an available market. If a buyer breaches a contract to 
purchase these commodities, the seller can usually im-
mediately turn to an open market where a price is readily 
obtainable for the merchandise. The merchandise sold by 
plaintiff in the instant case is a good deal different in that 
when the buyer repudiates her contract, the seller cannot 
turn to an available market, but rather must go through 
the very same process which he went through in the first 
instance in seeking out the new customer through re-
ferrals or door-to-door canvassing, demonstrating the 
merchandise to the satisfaction of the new buyer and ob-
taining the signature of the new buyer on the contract. 
These are the very things the Supreme Court of Utah dis-
cusses in the Stewart v. Hansen case, which, in the opinion 
of the Court, constituted such circumstances as would 
justify a departure from the strict rule. As stated by the 
annotater at 108 ALR 1487: 
0'f course, the circumstances may be such that 
it is impossible or impracticable to apply the rule 
allowing the seller the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price at the time and 
place of delivery. This is true where the goods have 
no market value, or where the rule if applied would 
work serious injustice. In such cases the rule is 
generally disregarded, the courts holding that as 
a measure of damages, it is of value only so far as 
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it puts the parties in the position they would have 
been in if the contract had been carried out and 
that where it does not lead to this result, other cri-
teria must be employed. 
In the Georgia case of Morrison vs. Finkovitch, supra, 
the Court stated: 
The rule which * * * allows recovery of the 
difference between the contract price and the 
market price at the time and place of delivery is 
founded upon the just theory that the seller on 
rejection of the goods may take them into the open 
market and obtain the current price for them. 
The plaintiff's testimony in the instant case that the goods 
could be sold by Hgoing out and knocking on doors and 
just rounding up a new customer" (Tr. 49) does not, by 
implication, mean that there is an Hopen market" and 
ucurrent price" available for the goods. As stated by Mr. 
Holland, Hit's just like making a sale all over again. You 
can't just call on someone to buy it. You have to go out 
and find someone" (Tr. 49). 
McCall vs. Jennings, 26 Utah 459, 73 Pac. 639 cited 
by defendant contains an instruction Hcorrectly setting 
forth the law in the abstract, but inapplicable when ap-
plied to the pleadings in the case." Since the case was re-
versed on other grounds it is difficult to determine what 
weight should be attached to the decision as it treats 
damages for breach of executory contracts. It is note-
worthy that no discussion is made of special circumstances 
as in Stewart vs. Hansen, supra. Love vs. St. Joseph Stock 
Yards Co. 51 Utah 305, 169 Pac. 951, treats damages in 
the breach of an executory contract to purchase horses, 
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an example of property for which there is an uopen" and 
uavailable" market and is thus distinguishable· on its facts. 
POINT THREE 
The contract contemplates the payment of an at-
torneys fee. The fact that defendant breached the con-
tract before delivery could be made, thus making the 
provision respecting repossession and sale inapplicable, 
should not deprive plaintiff of a reasonable attorney's fee 
for enforcing the contract to recover damages for its 
breach. 
CO·NCLUSION 
The la.w permits plaintiff in this case the benefit of 
his bargain. If the defendant now considers her contract 
to be a foolish one, she should not expect this Court to 
act as her guardian. She was of legal age at the time of 
the contract and fully understood its terms. She chose to 
accept the ulegal advice" of a competing cookware sales-
man and refused to perform her obligations under the 
contract. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict of the Trial Court should be 
affirmed. 
ALLEN M. SWAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
428 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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